Income Redistribution Going Awry: The Reversal Power of the Concern for Relative Depr ivation by Stark, Oded & Sorger, Gerhard
 






Income Redistribution Going Awry:
The Reversal Power of the Concern for Relative Deprivation
by
Gerhard Sorger & Oded Stark
lt  f i   i l i
. i i. i-t i .
i it  f i
i   i
i  i
. 
I  i t i ti  i :
 l  f t   f  l ti  i ti
   t
 
Income redistribution going awry: 




Gerhard Sorger  




Universities of Bonn, Klagenfurt, Tuebingen, and Vienna;  















Mailing Address: Oded Stark                                         November 2012 
 ZEF, University of Bonn  
 Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 
  D-53113 Bonn 
  Germany 
 
E-mail Address: ostark@uni-bonn.de 
 
 
We are indebted to the Editor and to an Associate Editor for advice and guidance, and to two 




We demonstrate that a rank-preserving transfer from a richer individual to a poorer individual 
can exacerbate income inequality (when inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient). This 
happens when individuals’ preferences depend negatively not only on work time (effort) but 
also on low relative income. It is rigorously shown that the set of preference profiles that 
gives rise to this perverse effect of a transfer on inequality is a non-empty open subset of all 
preference profiles. A robust example illustrates this result.  
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There is good reason to expect that a rank-preserving transfer from a richer individual to a 
poorer individual will reduce inequality. This point was made a century ago by Pigou (1912), 
and nearly a century ago by Dalton (1920). For example, Dalton (1920, p. 351) wrote: “[I]f 
there are only two income-receivers, and a transfer of income takes place from the richer to 
the poorer, inequality is diminished. There is, indeed, an obvious limiting condition. For the 
transfer must not be so large, as more than to reverse the relative positions of the two income-
receivers, and it will produce its maximum result, that is to say, create equality, when it is 
equal to half the difference between the two incomes.” Over the years, this perceptive 
statement has been adapted to populations of any size and has assumed the status of an 
essential property for any admissible index of inequality (see, for example, Weymark, 2006). 
The modern literature that resorts to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in inequality 
measurement is extensive. To name but few of the leading studies: Atkinson (1970), Sen 
(1973), Kolm (1977), Blackorby and Donaldson (1978, 1980), Donaldson and Weymark 
(1980), Kakwani (1980), Weymark (1981), Ebert (1984, 1987), Foster (1983), Shorrocks 
(1980, 1984), Foster and Shorrocks (1988), Chakravarty (1988), Bossert (1990), Lambert and 
Aronson (1993), and Cowell (1995).  
It is not an exaggeration to say that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is the 
cornerstone of inequality measurement theory. Yet, as we show in this paper, the widely 
accepted requirement to obey the principle may not hold if the individuals adjust their 
behavior in response to the transfer. In that case, there can be rank-preserving transfers from a 
richer individual to a poorer individual that increase the income disparity between them. This 
is a new problem and, because it questions the very basis of inequality measurement, it opens 
up a new research domain in the literature of inequality measurement.   
To see this vividly, consider the Gini coefficient (Gini, 1912), which is arguably the 
most popular index of inequality. In population {1,2, , }N n= … , 2n ≥ , let 
i
y  be the income 
of individual i . Let the incomes be ordered: 1 2 ny y y≤ ≤ … ≤ . The Gini coefficient of the 


























Consider now a rank-preserving (small) transfer 0τ >  from individual r  (the rich) to 
individual p  (the poor), where p r< , such that the post-transfer incomes 
r r
x y τ= − , 
p p
x y τ= + , and 
i i
x y=  for all \{ , }i N p r∈  satisfy 1 2 nx x x≤ ≤ …≤  (that is, the transfer 
preserves the ranking of the individuals according to their income). For the Gini coefficient of 
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This is what conventional wisdom and the received literature have led us to expect: a rank-
preserving transfer from the rich to the poor reduces inequality. However, a possible perverse 
outcome might have been overlooked: once the reason for the initial income gap 0
r p
y y− >  
is factored in and the adjustment of behavior in the wake of the transfer is taken into account, 
it could as well be the case that income inequality will be exacerbated rather than diminished. 
To demonstrate this possibility, we resort to distaste for low relative income and the 
associated concepts of relative deprivation and reference groups. We use a measure of relative 
deprivation based on the seminal work of Runciman (1966), and proposed by Yitzhaki (1979). 
We note that since the 1960s, a considerable body of research has demonstrated empirically 
that interpersonal comparisons of income (that is, comparisons of the income of an individual 
with the incomes of higher income members of his reference group) bear significantly on the 
perception of well-being, and on behavior.
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The relative deprivation of individual i N∈ , whose (post-transfer) income is 
i
x , is 
defined as 
 1
(1/ ) ( )  if ,















and the aggregate relative deprivation of the population is defined as 
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 For a review see Clark et al. (2008). Additional references are provided in Section 2 below as well as in 
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The explanation for the unexpected outcome of a rank-preserving transfer from the 
rich to the poor that we present in this paper is that the poor seek income for two reasons: to 
obtain income “for its own sake,” and to obtain income in order to hold at bay relative 
deprivation. When income is taken away from the rich, the relative deprivation sensed by the 
poor is reduced, and his incentive to work in order to maintain a “bearable level” of relative 
deprivation is correspondingly weakened. Add to this the additional reduction in relative 
deprivation for the poor from receiving that very income that is taken away from the rich. To 
take an example: when the population N  consists of just two individuals with post-transfer 














In this simple case of two individuals, it is obvious that the transfer reduces total relative 
deprivation, that is, the numerator in (4) is smaller than the pre-transfer value 2 1y y− . But 
what happens to the denominator? It is reasonable to suppose that the rich individual adjusts 
his working time (effort) such that he will not be subjected to as great a reduction in income 
as has been taken away from him yet that the adjustment falls short of neutralizing the 
(negative) transfer. The poor individual will surely scale back his working time. In 
combination, the two individuals working less than before implies that the sum of their 
incomes (the denominator of the Gini coefficient in (4)) is smaller than the corresponding pre-
transfer value 2 12( )y y+ . If the reduction in total income in the denominator dominates the 
reduction in total deprivation in the numerator, income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient will worsen. 
                                                 
3
 In equation (1) we presented the Gini coefficient as a function of the pre-transfer incomes 
i
y , i N∈ . Here, in 
equation (3), we already adjust for the transfers and, hence, express the Gini coefficient as a function of the post-
transfer incomes 
i
x , i N∈ . 
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2. A robust example 
To obtain rigorously the possibility illustrated heuristically above, we consider an economy in 
which the individuals produce a single consumption good. Specifically, we assume that 
individual i N∈  transforms labor (costly effort) into output of the consumption good at the 
rate of one-to-one. Individual i  has preferences that are described by the utility function 
( , , )i
i i i
U c RD y , where 
i
c  denotes the consumption of individual i , 
i
RD  is the relative 
deprivation of individual i  given in (2), and 
i
y  is the effort exerted by individual i  (which is 
equal to his output). Suppose that there is a transfer of size 0τ ≥  from a rich individual r  to a 
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Individual i  maximizes 
 ( , , )i
i i i
U c RD y  




y , and 
i
x , subject to (2), (5), and the budget constraint 
 .
i i
c x≤  (6) 
With regard to the utility functions, we assume that iU  maps 2(0, )
+
+∞ × R  to R , is 
twice continuously differentiable, concave, strictly increasing in 
i
c , and strictly decreasing in 
i
RD  and in 
i
y . Let U  be the set of all N-tuples 1 2( , , , )nU U U= …U  of functions with these 
properties and endow U  with the metric 
 ( , ) max{ ( , ) | , {0,1,2}},i i
k
d U U i N k= ∈ ∈d U U% %  
where ( , )
k
d f g  is the supremum norm of the k -th derivative of f g− . In words, two profiles 
U  and U%  are close to each other if all their n  components as well as the corresponding first 




Theorem 1. There exists an open set V U⊂  and a number 0τ >  such that the Gini 
coefficient ( )G τ  is strictly increasing with respect to the size of the transfer τ  for all 
[0, )τ τ∈  and all V∈U . 
The proof of this Theorem, which is presented in Appendix 2, is a constructive one. 
Specifically, we present a robust example of an economy in which the Gini coefficient 
depends positively on the size of the transfer. It is clear from the reasoning in Section 1 that 
Theorem 1 requires dependence of the individuals’ preferences on relative deprivation. The 
following example illustrates our main result. It is derived by the very same constructive 
approach that underlies the proof of Theorem 1, and it indicates that the effect of relative 
deprivation on the overall utility of an individual need not be excessively large. Specifically, 
when in this example we compute the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between 
consumption and relative deprivation, and the MRS between effort and relative deprivation, 
we find that all the marginal rates of substitution are larger than one (in absolute value), such 
that the individuals would be willing to trade a reduction of relative deprivation by one unit 
against an increase of consumption by less than one unit, or against a reduction of effort by 
less than one unit. In other words, the individuals in this example value relative deprivation 
strictly less than either consumption or effort. 
Example. Consider the case of 5n =  individuals, and suppose that their preferences are 












(17 / 25) (1 / 2)( )  if 1,
(107 /125) (1 / 2)( )  if 2,
( , , ) (99 / 25) ln( ) (1 / 2)  if 3,
(124 /125) (1 / 2)( )  if 4,
(13 / 5) (1 / 2)( ) (1 / 2)  if 5.
i i i i
c RD y i
c RD y i
U c RD y c RD y i
c RD y i
c RD y i
 − − =

− − =






If there is no transfer, the unique equilibrium results in income (8 ) / 5
i
x i= +  for every 
{1, 2, ,5}i ∈ … , and the Gini coefficient is (0) 4 / 55G = . 
Now assume that there is a transfer from the rich individual 3r =  to a poor individual 
{1, 2}p ∈  (which of the two poor individuals receives the transfer is irrelevant in this 
particular example). Figure 1 shows the income levels of all five individuals for all transfers 
[0,1 / 2)τ ∈ , starting with 1x  at the bottom and ending with 5x  at the top. Figure 2 shows the 
corresponding values of the Gini coefficient. It can be seen that the Gini coefficient is strictly 





Figure 1: Income levels as functions of the transfer. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Gini coefficient as a function of the transfer. 
 
Theorem 1 not only states that there exist examples like the one shown above, but that 
these examples are robust. As a consequence, the property of a strictly increasing Gini 
coefficient holds for all economies in which the utility functions are small perturbations of 




The result obtained in this paper is of considerable significance in the spheres of inequality 
measurement and social welfare. The prospect that a Pigou-Dalton transfer - a rank-preserving 
marginal transfer from a richer individual to a poorer individual - exacerbates (rather than 
reduces) inequality will require social planners and policy makers to evaluate closely the 
preferences of individuals (and the individuals’ expected behavioral responses) before 
subjecting the individuals to policy measures (tax and transfer) which could lead to outcomes 
that are orthogonal to the conventionally expected ones. If a Pigou-Dalton transfer ends up 
increasing inequality, then, upon such a transfer, an equality-favoring social welfare function 
will record a loss. The very choice of the social welfare function could then be affected: 
although a Pigou-Dalton transfer can entail a social welfare loss when the Gini coefficient 
registers an increase and social welfare is “standard” egalitarian, if social welfare is utilitarian 
and incorporates the individuals’ distaste for low relative income, social welfare need not 
decline. Furthermore, demonstrating that a Pigou-Dalton transfer fails to decrease income 
inequality could imply that a more stringent transfer principle will be needed to secure 
reduced inequality.   
 
Appendix 1: A brief foray into relative deprivation 
Our analysis is based on the sociological-psychological concepts of relative deprivation and 
reference groups, which are fitting tools for studying comparisons that affect an individual’s 
behavior, in this case comparisons with related individuals whose incomes are higher than his 
own income (cf. the large literature spanning from Duesenberry, 1949, up to, for example, 
Clark et al., 2008). An individual has an unpleasant sense of relative deprivation when he 
lacks a desired good and perceives that others in his reference group possess that good; see 
Runciman (1966).
4
 Given the income distribution of the individual’s reference group, the 
individual’s relative deprivation is the sum of the deprivation caused by every income unit 
that he lacks (Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey and Lambert, 1980; Ebert and Moyes, 2000; Bossert and 
D’Ambrosio, 2006; and Stark and Hyll, 2011). 
The pioneering study in modern times that opened the flood-gate to research on 
relative deprivation and primary (reference) groups is the two-volume set of Stouffer et al. 
                                                 
4
 In Runciman’s (1966) theory of RD, an individual’s reference group is the group of the individuals with whom 
the individual compares himself; cf. Singer (1981). 
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(1949a, 1949b). That work documented the dissatisfaction caused not by a given low military 
rank and weak prospects of promotion (military police) but rather by the pace of promotion of 
others (air force), and the lesser dissatisfaction of black soldiers stationed in the South who 
compared themselves to the local South black civilians than the dissatisfaction of their 
counterparts stationed in the North who compared themselves to the local North black 
civilians. Stouffer’s research was followed by a large social-psychological literature. 
Economics has caught up relatively late, and only somewhat. This is rather surprising because 
eminent economists in the past understood well that people compare themselves to others 
around them, and that social comparisons are of paramount importance for individuals’ 
happiness, motivations, and actions. Even Adam Smith (1776) pointed to the social aspects of 
the necessities of life, and stressed the relative nature of poverty: “A linen shirt, for example, 
is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very 
comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of 
Europe, a creditable day-laborer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, 
the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty […].” (p. 
465). Karl Marx’s (1849) observations that “Our wants and pleasures have their origin in the 
society; [… and] they are of a relative nature” (p. 33) emphasize the social nature of utility, 
and the impact of an individual’s relative position on his satisfaction. Inter alia, Marx (1849) 
wrote: “A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small, it 
satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, the 
house shrinks into a hut” (p. 33). Paul Samuelson (1973), one of the founders of modern 
neoclassical economics, pointed out that an individual’s utility does not depend only on what 
he consumes in absolute terms: “Because man is a social animal, what he regards as 
‘necessary comforts of life’ depends on what he sees others consuming.” (p. 218). 
The relative income hypothesis, formulated by Duesenberry (1949), posits an 
asymmetry in the comparisons of income which affect the individual’s behavior: the 
individual looks upward when making comparisons.
5
 Thorstein Veblen’s (1899) concept of 
pecuniary emulation explains why the behavior of an individual can be influenced by 
comparisons with the incomes of those who are richer. Because income determines the level 
of consumption, higher income levels may be the focus for emulation. Thus, an individual’s 
                                                 
5
 The empirical findings support the relative income hypothesis. Duesenberry (1949) found that individuals’ 
savings rates depend on their positions in the income distribution, and that the incomes of the richer people affect 
the behavior of the poorer ones (but not vice versa). Schor (1998) showed that, keeping annual and permanent 
income constant, the individuals whose incomes are lower than the incomes of others in their community saved 
significantly less than those who are relatively better off in their community.  
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income aspirations (to obtain the income levels of other individuals whose incomes are higher 
than his own) are shaped by the perceived consumption standards of the richer. In that way, 
invidious comparisons affect behavior, that is, behavior which leads to “the achievement of a 
favourable comparison with other men [...]”; see Veblen (1899, p. 33). 
Modern day evidence from econometric studies, experimental economics, social 
psychology, and neuroscience indicates that humans routinely compare themselves with other 
individuals who constitute their “comparison” or “reference” group, and that the outcome of 
that engagement impinges on their sense of well-being. People are dissatisfied when their 
consumption, income, or social standing fall below those of others with whom they naturally 
compare themselves (those who constitute their “reference group”). Consequently, economic 
processes are impacted, and economic realizations differ from what they would have been had 




(2010) reviewed data collected in 
2006-2007 as part of Wave 3 of the European Social Survey. Their analysis of a usable 
sample of around 19,000 observations for 18 countries reveals that income comparisons are 
acknowledged as at least somewhat important by a majority of Europeans; are mostly upward; 
and are associated with lower levels of happiness. In principle, there are (at least) five basic 
responses to the sensing of discontent or dismay from having an income that is lower than the 
incomes of others with whom comparisons are made: exerting more effort, exiting 
(migrating), acquiring better skills (enhancing productivity), demanding transfers by means of 
political redistribution, and sabotaging (the performance of) others. Examples of such 
responses are in Stark and Taylor (1991), Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Luttmer (2005), 
Fliessbach et al. (2007), Blanchflower and Oswald (2008), Takahashi et al. (2009), Stark and 
Fan (2011), Stark and Hyll (2011), Fan and Stark (2011), and Stark et al. (2012). The specific 
response depends on individual perceptions, preferences, and capabilities; on the nature of the 
economic and social environment; on the set of opportunities; on the time frame; and on the 
social and cultural norms. In our definition of relative deprivation we resort to income-based 
comparisons, namely, an individual feels relatively deprived when others in his comparison 
group earn more than he does.  
The theoretical possibility that behavior is modulated by individuals deriving 
satisfaction from looking down, rather than only by them experiencing deprivation from 
looking up, does not appear to have much of a basis. Andolfatto (2002) argues that while the 
utility of an individual rises in his own consumption, it declines in the consumption of any of 
his neighbors if that consumption falls below some minimal level; individuals are adversely 
10 
 
affected by the material well-being of others in their reference group when this well-being is 
sufficiently lower than theirs. Already a decade ago, Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Walker and 
Smith (2002) marshaled a large body of evidence that overwhelmingly supports the ‘‘upward 
comparison’’ view. 
 
Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 1 
The general idea of the proof is to construct an example and to show that this example is 
robust with respect to small perturbations of the preference profile U . In what follows, we 
proceed under the assumption (to be verified later) that the incomes are always ordered as 
1 2 nx x x< < …< . The assumption means that in the income hierarchy, the transfer τ  does not 
alter the ranking of the individuals by their incomes. We only elaborate on the case where 
r n< . The alternative case r n=  can be dealt with in a similar way. 





(1/ 2)( ) (1/ 2)  if ,
( , , ) ln( ) (1/ 2)  if ,
(1 / 2)( )      otherwise,
n n n n
i i i i r r r r
i i i i
A c RD y i n
U c RD y A c RD y i r
A c RD y
 − − =

= − − =
 − −
 
where 1A , 2A , ..., nA  are positive real numbers to be determined later. Obviously, it holds that 
U∈U . Using conditions (2) and (5), and noting that the budget constraint (6) must hold as an 




y , and 
i
RD . This implies, for example, that 
individual n  chooses 
n
x  in order to maximize 
 2(1/ 2) .
n n n
A x x−  
This problem has the unique solution 
 
n n
x A= . (7) 
Analogously, individual r  chooses 
r
x  so as to maximize 
 2
1
ln( ) (1/ ) ( ) (1/ 2)( ) .
n
r r j r r
j r
A x n x x x τ
= +
− − − +∑  
The first-order condition for this problem is 
 / ( ) / 0
r r r
A x n r n x τ+ − − − =  
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and has the unique positive solution 
 2(1/ 2)[( ) / ] [( ) / ] / 4 .r rx n r n n r n Aτ τ= − − + − − +  (8) 




(1/ 2) (1/ ) ( ) ,
n
i i j i i ip
j i
A x n x x x δ τ
= +
 





δ =  if i p= , and 0
ip








A n i n x x
= +
 + − − − =  ∑  (9) 
We continue with a series of lemmas. 
Lemma 1. For all \{ }i N r∈  it holds that 
i
RD  is independent of τ . 
Proof. For i n=  the claim holds trivially because 0
n
RD = . Now consider \{ , }i N r n∈ . For 
any such i  condition (9) must hold and it follows therefore that 
 
1
(1/ ) ( ) (1 ) / ( ),
n
i j i i
j i
RD n x x n A n i
= +
= − = − −∑  
which is independent of τ . □ 
Lemma 2. For all { 1, 2, , }i r r n∈ + + …  it holds that 
i
x  is independent of τ . 
Proof. For all { 1, 2, , 1}i r r n∈ + + … −  condition (9) must hold. Conditions (7) and (9) for 
{ 1, 2, , 1}i r r n∈ + + … −  form a system of n r−  linear equations in the n r−  unknowns 
1 2{ , , , }r r nx x x+ + … . Since these equations are linearly independent and also independent of τ , 
it follows that the values 1rx + , 2rx + , ..., nx  are uniquely determined and independent of τ .□ 
Lemma 3. For all {1, 2, , }i r∈ …  it holds that 
i
x  is strictly decreasing with respect to τ .  
Proof. For i r=  the statement follows easily from (8). We proceed by induction. Suppose we 
have already shown that 
j
x  is strictly decreasing with respect to τ  for all { , 1, , }j k k r∈ + … . 
Consider 1i k= −  and note that for this value of i , equation (9) holds. Solving this equation 
for 1i kx x −=  we obtain 
12 
 








= − + − − − + 
 
∑  
Since we have already proved that 
j
x  is strictly decreasing with respect to τ  for all 
{ , 1, , }j k k r∈ + …  and since 
j
x  is independent of τ  for all { 1, 2, , }j r r n∈ + + … , it follows 
from the displayed equation that 1kx −  must be strictly decreasing with respect to τ . □ 
Lemma 4. 
r
RD  is strictly increasing with respect to τ . 
Proof. We have that 
 
1




RD n x x
= +
= −∑  
In Lemma 2 we have shown that 
j
x  is independent of τ  whenever { 1, 2, , }j r r n∈ + + … , and 
from Lemma 3 it follows that 
r
x  is strictly decreasing with respect to τ . Combining these 
results it follows that 
r
RD  is strictly increasing with respect to τ . □ 























From Lemmas 1 and 4 it follows that the numerator on the right-hand side is strictly 
increasing with respect to τ , and from Lemmas 2 and 3 we obtain that the denominator is 
strictly decreasing with respect to τ . Together this implies that the Gini coefficient ( )G τ  is a 
strictly increasing function of τ . 
Up to now we have assumed that 1 2 nx x x< < …<  holds, and that all incomes ix  are 
strictly positive. We next show that we can indeed choose the parameters 1A , 2A , ..., nA  in 
such a way that these properties hold at least for all sufficiently small positive values of τ . By 
continuity, it suffices to show that we can find parameters 
i
A , i N∈ , such that for 0τ =  it 
holds that 1 0x >  and 
 1 1/ .i ix x n+ − =  (10) 
Condition (10) and 1 0x >  imply that 
13 
 
 1 ( 1) / ( 1) / .rx x r n r n= + − > −  
Together with (8) and 0τ = , this implies that 
 2 2( ) / (2 ) ( ) / (4 ) ( 1) / .rn r n n r n A r n− + − + > −  
It is obvious that we can choose 
r
A  in such a way that this inequality holds. We next note that 
we must have that ( ) /
n r
x x n r n− = − . Taking into account (7) and (8) for 0τ = , this 
translates into 
 2 2( ) / (2 ) ( ) / (4 ) ( ) /n r n rA x A n r n n r n A n r n− = − − − − + = −  
which is equivalent to 
 2 23( ) / (2 ) ( ) / (4 ) .n rA n r n n r n A= − + − +  
Since 
r
A  has already been chosen, this equation determines 
n
A . Finally, we note that 
1 1/i ix x n+ − =  implies that ( ) /j ix x j i n− = −  holds whenever j i>  and it follows from (9) 






( ) ( 1)





n i n i





   = − − − = − − = − >   ∑ ∑  
Thus, we have determined all parameters 
i
A , i N∈ , in such a way that the maintained 
assumption 1 20 nx x x< < < …<  is satisfied for all sufficiently small positive transfers. 
Finally, we have to show that the example is a robust one. But this follows 
immediately from the fact that all our results were derived from the first-order conditions, 
which involve only first-order partial derivatives of the utility functions. If we perturb the 
utility functions in such a way that the values of their first-order and second-order derivatives 
evaluated at the solution corresponding to 0τ =  remain close to the corresponding values of 
the example, then the positive dependence of the Gini coefficient on the size of the transfer 
will still obtain, at least locally at 0τ = . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. 
 
References  




Atkinson, A. B., 1970. On the measurement of inequality. Journal of Economic Theory 2, 
244-263.  
Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D., 1978. Measures of relative equality and their meaning in 
terms of social welfare. Journal of Economic Theory 18, 59-80. 
Blackorby, C., Donaldson, D., 1980. A theoretical treatment of indices of absolute inequality. 
International Economic Review 21, 107-136. 
Blanchflower, D.G., Oswald, A.J., 2008. Hypertension and happiness across nations. Journal 
of Health Economics 27, 218-233.  
Bossert, W., 1990. An axiomatization of the single-series Ginis. Journal of Economic Theory 
50, 82-92. 
Bossert, W., D’Ambrosio, C., 2006. Reference groups and individual deprivation. Economics 
Letters 90, 421-426. 
Chakravarty, S.R., 1988. Extended Gini indices of inequality. International Economic 
Review 29, 147-156. 
Clark, A.E., Frijters, P., Shields, M.A., 2008. Relative income, happiness, and utility: an 
explanation for the Easterlin paradox and other puzzles. Journal of Economic 
Literature 46, 95-144. 
Clark, A.E., Senik, C., 2010. Who compares to whom? The anatomy of income comparisons 
in Europe. Economic Journal 120, 573-594. 
Cowell, F.A., 1995. Measuring Inequality. London: Prentice-Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Dalton, H., 1920. The measurement of the inequality of incomes. Economic Journal 30, 348-
361. 
Donaldson, D., Weymark, J.A., 1980. A single-parameter generalization of the Gini indices 
of inequality. Journal of Economic Theory 22, 67-86. 
Duesenberry, J.S., 1949. Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ebert, U., 1984. Measures of distance between income distributions. Journal of Economic 
Theory 32, 266-274. 
Ebert, U., 1987. Size and distribution of incomes as determinants of social welfare. Journal 
of Economic Theory 41, 23-33. 
15 
 
Ebert, U., Moyes, P., 2000. An axiomatic characterization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual 
deprivation. Economics Letters 68, 263-270. 
Fan, C.S., Stark, O., 2011. A theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma. 
International Economic Review 52, 549-571. 
Fliessbach, K., Weber, B., Trautner, P., Dohmen, T., Sunde, U., Elger, C.E., Falk, A., 2007. 
Social comparison affects reward-related brain activity in the human ventral striatum. 
Science 318, 1305-1308. 
Foster, J.E., 1983. An axiomatic characterization of the Theil measure of income inequality. 
Journal of Economic Theory 31, 105-121. 
Foster, J.E., Shorrocks, A.F., 1988. Inequality and poverty orderings. European Economic 
Review 32, 654-662. 
Frey, B.S., Stutzer, A., 2002. Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions 
Affect Human Well-being. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Gini, C., 1912. Variabilità e Mutuabilità (Variability and Mutability). Reprinted in: Pizetti, 
E., Salvemini, T. (Eds.), 1955. Memorie di Metodologica Statistica. Rome: Liberia 
Eredi Virgilio Veschi. 
Hey, J.D., Lambert, P.J., 1980. Relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient: comment. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, 567-573. 
Kakwani, N., 1980. Income Inequality and Poverty: Methods of Estimation and Policy 
Applications. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Kolm, S.-C., 1977. Multidimensional egalitarianisms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 91, 1-
13. 
Lambert, P.J., Aronson, J.R., 1993. Inequality decomposition analysis and the Gini 
coefficient revisited. Economic Journal 103, 1221-1227. 
Luttmer, E.F.P., 2005. Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 120, 963-1002. 
Marx, K., 1849. Wage-Labour and Capital. The edition: New York: International Publishers, 
1933. 
Pigou, A.C., 1912. Wealth and Welfare. London: Macmillan. 
16 
 
Runciman, W.G., 1966. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to 
Social Inequality in Twentieth-Century England. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Samuelson, P.A., 1973. Economics, ninth ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Schor, J.B., 1998. The Overspent American: Why We Want What We Don’t Need. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Sen, A.K., 1973. On Economic Inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Shorrocks, A.F., 1980. The class of additively decomposable inequality measures. 
Econometrica 48, 613-625. 
Shorrocks, A.F., 1984. Inequality decomposition by population subgroups. Econometrica 52, 
1369-1385. 
Singer, E., 1981. Reference group and social evaluation. In: Rosenberg, M., Turner, R.H. 
(Eds.). Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives. New York: Basic Books, 66-93. 
Smith, A., 1776. The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter 2. The edition (by Andrew S. 
Skinner): London: Penguin Classics, 1999. 
Stark, O., Fan, C.S., 2011. Migration for degrading work as an escape from humiliation. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 77, 241-247. 
Stark, O., Hyll, W., 2011. On the economic architecture of the workplace: repercussions of 
social comparisons among heterogeneous workers. Journal of Labor Economics 29, 
349-375. 
Stark, O., Hyll, W., Wang, Y., 2012. Endogenous selection of comparison groups, human 
capital formation, and tax policy. Economica 79, 62-75.  
Stark, O., Taylor, J.E., 1991. Migration incentives, migration types: the role of relative 
deprivation. Economic Journal 101, 1163-1178. 
Stouffer, S.A., Suchman, E.A., DeVinney, L.C., Star, S.A., Williams, R.M. Jr., 1949a. The 
American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Vol. I. Studies in Social 
Psychology in World War II. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Stouffer, S.A., Lumsdaine, A.A., Lumsdaine, M.H., Williams, R.M. Jr., Smith, M.B., Janis, 
I.L., Star, S.A., Cottrell, L.S. Jr., 1949b. The American Soldier: Combat and Its 
Aftermath, Vol. II. Studies in Social Psychology in World War II. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
17 
 
Takahashi, H., Kato, M., Matsuura, M., Mobbs, D., Suhara, T., Okubo, Y., 2009. When your 
gain is my pain and your pain is my gain: neural correlates of envy and 
schadenfreude. Science 323, 937-939. 
Veblen, T., 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Reprints of Economic Classics: New 
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965. 
Walker, I., Smith, H.J., 2002. Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and 
Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weymark, J.A., 1981. Generalized Gini inequality indices. Mathematical Social Sciences 1, 
409-430. 
Weymark, J.A., 2006. The normative approach to the measurement of multidimensional 
inequality. In: Farina, F., Savaglio., E. (Eds.). Inequality and Economic Integration. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 303-328. 
Yitzhaki, S., 1979. Relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 93, 321-324. 
Zizzo, D.J., Oswald, A.J., 2001. Are people willing to pay to reduce others’ incomes? 
Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 63-64, 39-65. 
